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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No.20020678-CA
vs.
REX D. POWELL,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfromconvictions for one count of driving under the influence, a
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2001), and one
count of driving on a suspended license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of U TAH
CODE ANN.

§ 53-3-227(1) (1998) in the Fourth District Court, Utah County, the

Honorable Ray M. Harding presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp
2001).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. May defendant collaterally challenge two prior guilty pleas by showing only
that the pleas did not strictly comply with rule 11?

1

Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's collateral review of a
guilty plea for correctness. State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, f 4, 68 P.3d 1035.
2. Should this court review defendant's claim of insufficient evidence when
he did not preserve the claim below?
Standard of Review. This Court will not review unpreserved sufficiency claims
unless defendant on appeal asserts plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. Defendant here does not claim plain error or
exceptional circumstances.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal:
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-44(2)(a) (Supp. 2001):

A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person: (i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a
subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; (ii) is
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle; or (iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater at the time of operation or actual physical control.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp 2001):

A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it
is: (i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years
of two or more prior convictions; or (ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after
July 1,2001; or (B) a felony violation under this section that is committed
after July 1,2001.

2

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 53-3-227(1) (1998):

(1) A person whose driving privilege has been denied, suspended,
disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in
which the person's driving privilege was granted and who drives any motor
vehicle upon the highways of this state while that driving privilege is
denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be punished as provided
in this section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of driving under the
influence (DUI) and one count of driving on a suspended license (R. 2, 24, 145).
Defendant's prior convictions for DUI enhanced the DUI charge to a third degree felony
(R. 2). In a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted defendant of DUI and of driving on a
suspended license (R. 71, 90, 95, 148-49, 173:4). Defendant waived his right to a jury
trial on the enhancement to the DUI charge, and the jury was dismissed (R. 173:5;
175:147-48).
During the bench trial on the enhancement, defendant moved to suppress the
evidence of his prior convictions on the ground that they were based on guilty pleas that
were not knowing and voluntary (R. 97-114,173:7). After considering memorandums and
argument from both sides, the trial court admitted the prior convictions and applied the
enhancement (R. 97-131,136-143,154). On July 9,2002, the court entered judgment and
sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of zero-to-five years for the enhanced
DUI and six months for driving on a suspended license (R. 153-54,170:4-5). Defendant
timely appealed (R. 155-158).
3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
The evening of Saturday, December 29, 2001, Orem police officers received a
citizen report that defendant was intoxicated and was driving his truck in a residential
area. (R. 175:54, 63, 79). After officers located and arrested defendant, he submitted to
a breathalyser test and registered a blood-alcohol level of .341, more than four times the
legal limit (R. 175:92; State's Ex. 3).
Mr. and Mrs. Baxley were the citizens who reported defendant's condition to the
police (R. 175:53-75). At 8:15 p.m., Mrs. Baxley heard a truck pull into the driveway of
their home (R. 175:53). She looked out thefrontwindow and saw a man get out of the
truck and stagger towards the house (R. 175:53-54). She called to Mr. Baxley, who went
to thefrontdoor to greet the stranger (R. 175:54,61-62). When the doorbell didn't ring,
Mr. Baxley opened thefrontdoor and saw defendant descending the stairs to the lower
entrance of the Baxley home (R. 175:62). Mr. Baxley stepped onto his porch and asked
defendant what he needed (R. 175:62). Defendant slurred a cryptic reply, "Butch Walker"
(R. 175:62). Mr. Baxley did not know anybody named Butch Walker, but he told
defendant that the Walkers lived next door (R. 175:62). He then watched defendant
stumble back to his red and white Ford pickup and climb into the driver's side of the truck
(R. 175:62-63). Defendant backed out of the Baxley's driveway and drove along the
public street to the next house (R. 175:63).
1

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92.
4

Mr. Baxley was concerned that defendant might pose a danger to other drivers (R.
175:63). His years investigating airplane crashes for the Air Force had taught him to
protect the integrity of evidence by maintaining eye contact, so he told his wife to call 911
while he remained on the porch and watched defendant drive to the Walker's house (R.
175:54,63,72). The multiple security lights on the front and side of Mr. Baxley's house
lit up the front yards of both Mr. Baxley and the Walkers (R. 175:72-74). There were no
obstructions in either yard that prevented Mr. Baxley from watching defendant (R.
175:63-64). He noted that defendant was the only person in the cab of the pickup (R.
175:71).
Defendant pulled his car into the Walker's driveway, and walked up to the front
door (R. 175:63-64). He remained there briefly and then returned to his truck (R. 175:6465).
Officer Leany was the first officer on the scene (R. 175:112-13). He found
defendant sitting alone in the driver's seat of the pickup (R. 175:80). There was an inch
of fresh snow on the ground, and Officer Leany observed a single set of tire tracks leading
from the Baxley residence along the street to defendant's pickup (R. 175:81,93, 111). He
also observed a single set of footprints leading from the driver's side of defendant's truck
to the Walker's front door and back to the truck (R. 175:81, 111-12).
Officer Leany smelled "a very strong and rancid odor of alcohol" coming from
defendant's breath through the open window of the truck (R. 175:81). He ordered

5

defendant out of the pickup (R. 175:82). Defendant belligerently refused and admitted
that he was intoxicated, but claimed it didn't matter because he had not driven his pickup
(R. 175:82). Using slurred, lethargic, and nearly incomprehensible speech, defendant
explained how hisfriendhad driven him to the Walker home and then left him there (R.
175:82). Officer Leany opened the pickup truck door (R. 175:83). Defendant slid out and
staggered up against the truck (R. 175:83). He placed his hands behind his back and said,
"Fine, then take me to jail where at least I can get some sleep" (R. 175:83).
Officer Leany determined that defendant "was very impaired and should not be
driving a motor vehicle" (R. 175:83). He arrested defendant and transported him to the
police station for a breathalyser test (R. 175:84-85). During the booking process, Officer
Leany learned that defendant's driver's license had been revoked (R. 175:83; State's Ex.
5). When defendant blew into the mouthpiece of the Intoxilyzer 5000, it registered his
blood-alcohol level at .341 (R. 175:92; State's Ex. 3).
Defendant was charged with DUI with a felony enhancement and driving on a
suspended license (R. 2,24,145). In a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted defendant of DUI
and driving on a suspended license (R. 71,90,95,148-49,173:4). Defendant waived his
right to a jury trial on the felony enhancement (R. 175:147-48). The state presented the
trial court with two certified judgments against defendant for DUI (R. 173:6-7; State's Ex.
6A & 6B). The first, dated December 12,1996, was case number 965008568 in the Orem
Department of the Utah Fourth District Court (R. State's Ex. 6A). It indicated that
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defendant was represented by counsel and entered a plea of guilty to DUI (R. State's Ex.
6A). The second, dated June 28,1999, was case number 995300016 in the Spanish Fork
Department of the Fourth District Court (R. State's Ex. 6B). It also indicated that
defendant was represented by counsel and pled guilty to DUI (R. State's Ex. 6B).2
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Point I: Once the state presents evidence of a conviction based on a guilty plea,
a presumption of regularity arises that the defendant may rebut only by presenting some
evidence of involuntariness. A plea entered with assistance of counsel is presumed
voluntary absent affirmative evidence of involuntariness. Defendant's prior guilty pleas
were made with the assistance of counsel and are therefore presumed voluntary.
Defendant incorrectly articulates the standard for a collateral review of a guilty plea to be
used to enhance a conviction. The standard on collateral review is voluntariness, not strict
compliance with rule 11, yet defendant asserts only that rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure was not strictly complied with. He points to no affirmative evidence
that his pleas were involuntary. His challenge therefore fails.
Point II. Defendant did not preserve his claim of insufficient evidence, and this
Court should therefore reject it. Additionally, defendant's claim that the State presented
no evidence that he was in actual physical control of the vehicle is incorrect. Two of the
2

The second judgment against defendant does not indicate on its face that his
conviction arose from a guilty plea. However, defendant represented at trial the
conviction was from a guilty plea (R. 173:7). He later produced uncertified transcripts of
the plea colloquy indicating that he pled guilty (R. 103-07).
7

three witnesses for the State presented both direct and circumstantial evidence that
defendant was the driver and sole occupant of the pickup truck.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT MAY NOT COLLATERALLY ATTACK HIS GUILTY
PLEAS BY SHOWING MERE FAILURE TO STRICTLY COMPLY
WITH RULE 11; RATHER, HE MUST DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL
INVOLUNTARINESS
Defendant claims that the trial court incorrectly relied on his prior DUI convictions
to enhance the instant conviction because "neither of [defendant's] prior guilty pleas
complied with Rule 11(e)." Aplt Br. at 10. Defendant's claim misstates the standard for
evaluating a collateral attack on a guilty plea, and his subsequent analysis does not
demonstrate that his prior guilty pleas were involuntary. Thus, defendant's claim fails.
A.

Defendant must prove involuntariness, not mere noncompliance with
rule 11.

To enhance a DUI convictionfroma class B misdemeanor to a third degree felony,
a court must find that the defendant has previously been convicted of driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs two or more times within 10 years of the current conviction.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2), (6) (Supp. 2001).
However, "an involuntary guilty plea cannot be used to enhance or support a
subsequent conviction." State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187,1192 (Utah 1987) (citing Burgett
v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967)); State v. Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95, f 7, 68 P.3d 1035
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(quoting Branch, 743 P.2d at 1192). Similarly, unless counsel was knowingly waived, an
uncounseled prior conviction may not be used to enhance a subsequent conviction. State
v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 147 (Utah 1989) (citing Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115). Although
Triptow was an habitual criminal case, its reasoning applies to DUI enhancements. State
v. Pooler, 2002 UT App 299, f 5, 56 P.3d 979.
When the State relies on a prior conviction to enhance a present offense, "the State
bears the burden of proving the prior conviction . . ." Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149. "A
previous judgment of conviction so proven is entitled to a presumption of regularity,
including a presumption that the defendant was represented by counsel. This presumption
satisfies any initial burden the State may have of proving that the defendant had or
knowingly waived counsel." Id.; see also Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95 at f 7. The burden
then shifts to defendant: "After proof of the previous conviction is introduced, the burden
is on the defendant to raise the issue and produce some evidence that he or she was not
represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel." Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149;
see also Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95 at f 7 (holding that self-serving affidavit of defendant
is insufficient evidence to rebut presumption of regularity). This showing shifts the
burden back to the State: "Once the defendant has presented some evidence, the
presumption of regularity is rebutted and the burden shifts to the State to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was in fact represented or knowingly
waived representation." Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149; Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95 at f 7.

9

However, the cases require only that the prior guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary, not that the plea colloquy complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. This is so because an attack on prior convictions in this context is "by
definition" collateral: defendant seeks "to deprive them of their normal force and effect
in a proceeding that [has] an independent purpose other than to overturn the prior
judgments." Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,30 (1992). When collaterally attacking a guilty
plea (instead of mounting a direct appeal), a defendant "is entitled to relief only if the
alleged violation of rule 11 is also a violation of [defendant's] constitutional rights."
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,991 (Utah 1993). Not all rule 11 violations amount to
constitutional violations. See id. A constitutional violation affects the knowing and
voluntary nature of a plea. See id. "[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing,
intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right
and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances

" See United States v.

Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
In seeking evidence of voluntariness in this context, the court is not limited to the
plea colloquy. The presence of counsel, the plea affidavit, prior guilty pleas, and
defendant's familiarity with the legal system may be considered in determining
voluntariness. See Parke, 506 U.S. at 37. Additionally, the reviewing court may rely on
representations by defense counsel in the record that she explained the nature of the
offense to the defendant. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637,647 (1976) (approving
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reliance on defense counsel representations). The court may even presume that counsel
explained the nature of the offense to the defendant where counsel does not expressly so
state. Id.
B.

Defendant failed to show involuntariness.

The record indicates that defendant's pleas were voluntary. In both instances
defendant was represented by counsel; therefore his pleas are presumed voluntary (R.
State's Ex. 6A& 6B). In addition, neither of the transcripts provided by defendant shows
any evidence of involuntariness; in fact, they further support that defendant's prior pleas
were voluntary.
In the Orem court, Judge Dimick explained to defendant all the elements of the
charge of DUI and the minimum and maximum punishments (R. 109-10). Both he and
the prosecutor also explained the factual allegations (R. 108-09). Judge Dimick allowed
defendant to confer privately with his attorney (R. 108-09). Defendant then entered a plea
of guilty (R. 108). Farfromindicating involuntariness, the transcript shows that defendant
understood the nature of the charge, the factual allegations supporting the charge, and the
possible punishments and that defendant was allowed to confer with counsel. Without
evidence of involuntariness, this Court must presume that defendant's plea was voluntary.
See Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95 at f 8.
In the Spanish Fork court, the record indicates that defendant's guilty plea was part
of a plea bargain (R. 107). The prosecution informed defendant of the charges and
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established a factual basis (R. 105-07). Defendant's attorney stated that he had spoken
with defendant and expressed his opinion that defendant understood his rights (R. 107).
Again, the record gives no indication of involuntariness, but rather, demonstrates that
defendant understood his rights and the nature of the charges and had an opportunity to
confer with counsel. Thus, this Court must presume voluntariness. See Gutierrez, 2003
UTApp95atf 8.
Consequently, defendant's claim fails.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S SUFFICIENCY CLAIM SHOULD BE REJECTED
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT PRESERVED BELOW; MOREOVER, IT
LACKS MERIT
Defendant claims that the jury verdicts of guilty for DUI and driving on a
suspended license were clearly erroneous because the "the evidence is lacking in a
showing beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Powell was the one in physical control of the
truck." Aplt. Br. at 16. Defendant's claim fails because is it unpreserved and because the
trial testimony established that defendant was the sole occupant and driver of the truck.
A.

Defendant did not preserve his claim*

"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. To properly preserve a claim,
a party must present the objection to the trial court, state the grounds for the objection
specifically and distinctly, and ensure that the objection and its supporting arguments
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become part of the trial record. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah 1989);
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,361 (Utah App. 1993). "[This] rule applies to every claim,
including constitutional questions

" Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 11. In the context of

claims of insufficient evidence, the preservation rule "prevents] a defendant from
deliberately foregoing relief below based on the sufficiency of the evidence, hoping that
a remediable evidentiary defect might not be perceived and corrected, thus strategically
facilitating the defendant's chance for a reversal on appeal." Id. at f 16. A court may
review an unpreserved claim only if itfindsexceptional circumstances or plain error. Id.
att 11.
Defendant never challenged the sufficiency of the evidence before the trial court,
nor has he claimed exceptional circumstances or plain error. In fact, defendant's brief
does not even address preservation of his claim. His claim is therefore unpreserved, and
this Court may reject it on that ground alone. See State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, f 9,46 P.3d
230 (stating that court will not review utipreserved claims where appellant fails to allege
and demonstrate plain error)
B.

The evidence established that defendant was the sole occupant
and driver of the truck.

Defendant's insufficiency claim lacks merit in any event. When an appellate court
reviews a claim of insufficient evidence, it must "determine only whether sufficient
competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each element of the charge." State v. Honie,
2002 UT 4,1f 44, 57 P.3d 977, cert denied, 123 S.Ct. 257. The court does not weigh the
13

credibility of witnesses, but rather reviev/s "the evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." Id.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of his convictions of DUI and driving on a
suspended license. Aplt. Br. at 10. Driving under the influence of alcohol is a violation
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44, which states, in relevant part, the following:
(a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person: (i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a
subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test; (ii) is under the
influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any
drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a
vehicle; or (iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-44(2)(a) (emphasis added).

Driving on a suspended license is a violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-3-227,
which states the following:
A person whose driving privilege has been denied, suspended, disqualified,
or revoked under this chapter or under the laws of the state in which the
person's driving privilege was granted and who drives any motor vehicle
upon the highways of this state while that driving privilege is denied,
suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be punished as provided in this
section.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 53-3-227(1) (emphasis added).

Defendant concedes that he was intoxicated above the legal limit and that his
license was revoked. Aplt Br. at 11. His only claim is that the State failed to prove that
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he operated or was in actual physical control of the truck.3 Defendant's claim contradicts
the record.
Mr. Baxley testified that he saw defendant enter the driver's side of the pickup and
that defendant was the only one in the vehicle (R. 175:71). Mr. Baxley also testified that
he watched as defendant drove his truck to the Walker residence (R. 175:63). Officer
Leany testified that when he arrived on the scene he found defendant alone in the vehicle
(R. 175:80). He also stated that he only observed one set of tire tracks in the snow and
one set of footprints leading to andfromthe Walker'sfrontdoor (R. 175:81,93,111-12).
Mr. Baxley's direct observation and Officer Leany's circumstantial observations provided
ample evidence for the jury to find that defendant operated or was in actual physical
control of the truck both when it arrived at Mr. Baxley's home and when it traveled from
Mr. Baxley's driveway to the Walker's driveway. The only testimony that defendant did
not drive the vehicle camefromthe defendant himself (R. 175:105-07).
Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient because "[n]o one testified they
actually saw Mr. Powell drive the truck into the driveway of the Baxleys." Aplt. Br. at
15. Defendant is incorrect. Mr. Baxley testified, "The defendant is the only one I saw in
the vehicle," and "[I] maintained eye contact with [defendant's] vehicle as [defendant]
pulled up one house and into the Walker's driveway" (R. 175:63,71). In any event, factfinders may draw reasonable inferencesfromthe evidence. See State v. Fedoromcz, 2002
UT 67, f 41, 52 P.3d 1194 (holding circumstantial evidence may support a conviction).
3

Defendant also does not dispute that the street infrontof the Walker residence is a
"highway of this state," as required by Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(1).
15

The jury here could reasonably have inferred from Mr. Baxley's and Officer Leany's
testimonies that defendant was the person who drove defendant's truck on the occasion
in question. Indeed, if the jury believed Mr. Baxley's and Officer Leany's testimony, they
could have drawn no other inference.
Thus, the evidence that defendant operated his truck while intoxicated was sufficient,
and defendant's claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted o r i ^ T l u l y 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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tant Attorney General
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